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This article examines the effects of macroeconomic variables (i.e., housing starts, 
disposable income, and the exchange rate), market variables (i.e., lumber price and 
wage rate) and the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA06) on U.S. lumber 
imports from Canada. It also looks at the welfare consequences of the SLA06. Results 
suggest that macroeconomic variables are more important than lumber price in 
determining the bilateral trade in softwood lumber. It is also found that, although the 
SLA06 has a significant negative effect on lumber imports from Canada, the market 
and welfare impacts of the trade restriction are moderate.    
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Introduction 
ince the early 1980s, a number of disputes concerning softwood lumber trade 
have arisen between the United States and Canada. The very latest trade dispute 
between the two countries has come as a result of the expiration of the 1996 Softwood 
Lumber Agreement (SLA96; April 1996-March 2001), which imposed a tariff-
regulated quota regime on Canadian lumber. In April 2001, U.S. producers filed 
countervailing (CV) and antidumping (AD) petitions, claiming that subsidized and 
below-cost Canadian lumber was being dumped on the U.S. market, harming the U.S. 
lumber industry. The International Trade Commission issued its finding that the U.S. 
lumber industry is threatened with material injury by imports of Canadian lumber. As 
a result, in May 2002, the U.S. government imposed CV (18.79 percent) and AD (8.43 
percent) duties on Canadian lumber. Canadian interests, including the Canadian 
federal and provincial governments and Canadian producers and exporters, challenged 
various aspects of these and other related unfair trade and injury determinations before 
the United States Court of International Trade and World Trade Organization and 
North American Free Trade Agreement panels. After several years of negotiations to 
resolve the protracted multi-forum litigation, in September 2006, the United States 
and Canada signed the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA06), which involves 
export charges and volume restraints to regulate Canadian lumber. The SLA06 will be 
in force for a term of seven years, with an option to renew for two additional years. 
The objective of this article is to examine the effect of the most recent episode of 
the U.S. trade restrictions – that is, the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement – on U.S. 
lumber imports from Canada. Although the literature on the economic consequences 
of the lumber trade dispute is fairly large (for example, Wear and Lee, 1993; Myneni, 
Dorfman and Ames, 1994; Lindsey, Groombridge and Loungani, 2001; Zhang, 2001; 
Baek and Yin, 2006), little attention has been paid to inclusion in their models of an 
appropriate measure (i.e., disposable income) of the likely impact of economic 
activity on the demand for lumber. More specifically, U.S. demand for lumber is 
mainly derived from demand for new homes, and repair and remodeling; the former is 
determined by housing starts, whereas the latter is decided by disposable income (Uri 
and Boyd, 1990; Sarker, 1996; Baek and Yin, 2006). These two factors are key 
measures of the likely effects of economic activity on lumber consumption and 
imports. Hence, inclusion of both variables in an empirical model would be desirable 
to explain lumber demand accurately; so far, however, studies evaluating U.S.-Canada 
lumber trade have frequently overlooked this issue. Bearing this in mind, therefore, 
our empirical focus is placed on analyzing the dynamic effects of the SLA06 together 
with macroeconomic variables such as housing starts, disposable income and 
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exchange rate, and lumber market variables such as lumber price and wage rate, as 
well as the consequent effects of the SLA06 on U.S. consumer costs and producer 
profits. 
The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement 
he SLA06 stipulates obligations of the United States and Canada, export 
measures and a surge mechanism. Under the SLA06, the United States agrees to 
revoke the CV/AD duty orders of May 2002 and fully to refund all CV/AD duty cash 
deposits arising from these orders (approximately US$5 billion). In addition, the 
United States commits for the duration of the SLA06 not to impose other trade 
remedies. In return, Canada agrees to impose a mixture of export charges and volume 
restraints on its lumber exports to the United States. The main points of the SLA06 are 
summarized as follows. 
Export Measures 
Canadian regions – British Columbia (BC) coast, BC interior, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec – can choose between two export-charge regimes for 
periods of three years: (1) Option A: an export charge with the charge varying with the 
prevailing monthly price or (2) Option B: an export charge plus volume restraint, 
where both the rate and the volume restraint vary with the prevailing monthly price. 
The prevailing monthly price means the most recent four-week average of the weekly 
framing lumber composite (FLC) prices (produced by Random Lengths Publications 
Inc.) available 21 days before the beginning of the month to which the prevailing 
monthly price shall be applied (Annex 7A). Under both options, export charges are 
imposed when the prevailing monthly price is at or below US$355 per thousand board 
feet (MBF), and the charges increase as the price declines (table 1). In addition, for the 
purpose of preserving Canada’s share of the U.S. market and addressing increases in 
third-country share of the U.S. market, Canada can retroactively refund export charges 
(up to the equivalent of a 5 percent charge) if (1) the third-country market share 
increases by at least 20 percent, (2) Canadian market share decreases, and (3) U.S. 
domestic producers’ market share increases. 
Surge Mechanism 
Each region that has elected Option A will be allocated a share of exports based on its 
historic share of the U.S. market, which is referred to as trigger volume. Specifically, a 
region’s trigger volume for a particular month is determined by multiplying the total 
monthly expected U.S. consumption (EUSC) by the region’s U.S. market share, and 
then multiplying that product by 1.1 (Annex 8). The monthly EUSC means the 
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volume of softwood lumber expected to be consumed in the U.S. in a particular month 
(Annex 7D). The formula for calculating the monthly EUSC is EUSC = [USCR|12] × 
SAF, where USCR is U.S. consumption for the latest 12-month period and SAF is the 
seasonal adjustment factor for the pertinent month. If the volume of exports from a 
region in a month exceeds 110 percent of its trigger volume, then the export charge on 
the volume from that region during that month will be increased by 50 percent. 
Arguments: Canada’s Breach of the SLA06 
n August 2007, the United States submitted its statement of the case regarding 
Canada’s breaches of the SLA06 to the London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA). The first key issue that the two parties argued is whether the SLA06 requires 
Canada to apply the complete calculation of the expected U.S. consumption (EUSC), 
including the adjustment to EUSC (application of paragraph 14 of Annex 7D), to all 
exporting regions, that is, to Option A regions (BC coast, BC interior and Alberta) in 
addition to Option B regions (Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec). The full 
text of paragraph 14 of Annex 7D reads as follows: “If U.S. Consumption during a 
Quarter differs by more than 5 percent from Expected U.S. Consumption during that 
Quarter, as calculated under paragraph 12, the calculation of Expected U.S. 
Consumption for the following Quarter for which quotas are being determined shall 
be adjusted as follows. Specifically, the difference (in MBF) between U.S. 
Consumption and Expected U.S. Consumption for the Quarter shall be divided by 3 
and the amount derived shall be added to (if U.S. Consumption was more than 
expected) or subtracted from (if U.S. Consumption was less than expected) the 
monthly Expected U.S. Consumption calculated under paragraph 12 for each month in 
the next Quarter for which quotas are determined.” 
The second key argument is whether Canada was required to begin to apply the 
complete calculation of the EUSC as of the agreement’s effective date (January 2007 
vs. July 2007). In the second half of 2006, for example, actual U.S. lumber 
consumption was more than 5 percent below estimates of EUSC as calculated under 
paragraph 14 of Annex 7D. This means that adjusted EUSC should have been used 
instead of unadjusted EUSC in the formula for determining quota volume for the 
Option B regions during the first half of 2007. Claiming that no adjustment under 
paragraph 14 of Annex 7D is required for the Option B regions until July 1, 2007, 
however, Canada has begun to apply adjusted EUSC to the Option B regions only 
since July 2007. During the period from January 2007 through June 2007, therefore, 
the Option B regions might have over-exported their lumber to the United States (see 
the later section Market and Welfare Impact of the SLA06). 
I Jungho Baek 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   73 
 
The LCIA concluded that the SLA06 does not obligate Canada to apply the 
complete calculation of the EUSC to Option A, but that the SLA06 obligates Canada 
to make the calculation of the EUSC for all export measures for softwood lumber as 
of January 1, 2007. The decision can thus be interpreted to mean that the SLA06 
obligates Canada to calculate EUSC to determine quota volumes of softwood lumber 
imports from Canada’s Option B regions pursuant to paragraph 14 of Annex 7D as of 
January 1, 2007. 
Dynamics of the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade 
t is worth emphasizing here that, for a careful analysis, it is important to construct 
the U.S. lumber market properly and to identify the effects of the trade restrictions 
and other market variables on U.S. lumber imports from Canada. For this purpose, we 
have estimated the effects of the trade restrictions (the MOU, the SLA96 and the 
SLA06), macroeconomic factors (housing starts, disposable income and exchange 
rate) and lumber market factors (lumber price and wage rate) on U.S. lumber imports 
from Canada. The results show that all macroeconomic and market variables are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level and have the expected signs (table 2). 
More specifically, a positive coefficient of the lumber price on lumber imports from 
Canada suggests that these imports tend to increase as the domestic lumber price rises. 
Positive coefficients of housing starts and disposable income on lumber imports from 
Canada indicate that an increase in real domestic income and economic activity leads 
to an increase in U.S. imports of Canadian lumber through the increased demand for 
new homes and remodeling and repairs. A negative coefficient of the wage rate on 
imports of lumber from Canada shows that labour is a complement to imported 
lumber from Canada. A positive coefficient of the exchange rate on imports of lumber 
from Canada suggests that the weakening Canadian dollar makes the price of 
Canadian lumber cheaper in the U.S. market and leads to an increase in lumber 
imported to the United States from Canada. Notice that the effect of the lumber price 
on imports of Canadian lumber is found to be much smaller than that of market and 
macroeconomic variables such as housing starts, disposable income and exchange 
rate. As the lumber price increases by 1 percent, for example, imports of Canadian 
lumber increase by approximately 0.14 percent. Given a 1 percent increase in housing 
starts and disposable income, on the other hand, imports increase by approximately 
0.50 percent and 0.81percent, respectively. 
Our results also show that the MOU, covering January 1990-September 1991, had 
a negative effect of 6 percent on Canadian lumber imports (see the data section in the 
technical annex to this article for detailed discussion of dummy variables). 
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Additionally, our results show that the SLA06 covering July 2007-December 2007 
(SLA06-П) depressed Canadian lumber imports by around 9 percent, whereas the 
SLA06 covering January 2007-June 2007 (SLA06-І) had little impact. This finding 
thus provides evidence to support the hypothesis that Canada (i.e., Option B regions) 
might have over-exported lumber to the United States under the SLA06 during the 
period from January 2007 to June 2007 by failing to compute the correct export 
volumes (i.e., quota volume). Finally, SLA06-ІІІ is found to have had a significant 
and negative impact, suggesting that the financial crisis combined with the recent 
trade restriction reduced imports of Canadian lumber by as much as 26 percent for the 
period January 2008-December 2009. Notice that the SLA96 is found to be 
statistically insignificant even at the 10 percent level, indicating that the SLA96 had 
little impact on the lumber market. 
Market and Welfare Impacts of the SLA06  
ur results show that the SLA06 did take effect in the second half of 2007, 
reducing Canadian exports by 9 percent (table 2).
1 Given that result, we now 
turn our attention to assessment of potential market and welfare impacts of the SLA06 
during the period from July 2007 through December 2007. For this purpose, we 
simulate what the market conditions would have been if the SLA06 had not been 
imposed. Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning that it is impossible to estimate 
the effects of Option A and Option B separately due to unavailability of the needed 
data and export price elasticities for different regions. For analytical convenience, 
therefore, it is assumed that the SLA06 would take the form only of a 15 percent 
export charge, or Option A. Since lumber prices were below $315/MBF during the 
year (table 1), and given that provinces that chose Option A (BC coast/interior and 
Alberta) account for more than 70 percent of Canadian lumber exports to the United 
States, this assumption may not be unreasonable. Certainly, it should be understood 
that a uniform 15 percent export charge would be an upper bound of potential market 
and welfare changes. 
We calculate the market and welfare impacts of the SLA06 using the price 
elasticities estimated from previous studies (table 3). For sensitivity analysis, two 
different (i.e., highest- and lowest-) price elasticities are used to evaluate the welfare 
impacts of the SLA06-П: (1) case І (-0.08 for domestic demand, 0.13 for domestic 
supply and 0.18 for Canadian exports) and (2) case II (-0.174 for domestic demand, 
0.70 for domestic supply and 0.917 for Canadian exports). The results for case І, for 
example, show that Canadian exports would have been reduced by 682 MMBF during 
the six months (2007:7-12), and market price would have been $43 higher per MBF. 
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As such, U.S. production would have been boosted by 360 MMBF. Together, these 
results could lead to a U.S. producer gain of $705 million. Likewise, Canadian 
producers could have gained $882 million. Compared with the welfare impacts of 
other trade restrictions such as the MOU and the SLA96 obtained by previous studies 
(e.g., Wear and Lee, 1994; Zhang, 2001; Baek and Yin, 2006), the SLA06 has only 
moderate market and welfare consequences on the lumber market. Notably, the 
Canadian producer gain is sensitive to changes in the price elasticity of Canadian 
export supply. 
Moreover, recall the LCIA’s decision that the SLA06 obligates Canada to 
calculate EUSC to determine quota volumes of softwood lumber imports from 
Canada’s Option B regions pursuant to paragraph 14 of Annex 7D as of January 1, 
2007. For completeness, therefore, it is interesting to assess whether the Option B 
regions over-exported their lumber to the United States in the first half of 2007. Our 
assessments show that over-exports from Option B regions did occur for the period 
from January 2007 through June 2007; in aggregate, the over-exports by the regions 
amounted to 155.3 MMBF, with 76.2 MMBF from Ontario and 74.5 MMBF from 
Quebec (table 4).
2 Additionally, the welfare impacts show that the over-exports 
displaced U.S. production by 82.8 MMBF and exports from other Canadian provinces 
by 25.1 MMBF.
3 Lumber prices were depressed by about 2 percent on a monthly 
basis. So U.S. producers lost $91 million. In Canada, the Option B region gained $3.7 
million from its over-exports to the United States – the difference between its total 
revenue actually received and its total revenue that would have been received if the 
SLA06 had been applied properly – whereas the other region, not subject to the 
SLA06 export restraint, lost $5.8 million. 
Concluding Remarks 
he main purpose of this article is to assess the market and welfare impacts of the 
2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement. A better understanding of the dynamic 
structure of the North American lumber market is particularly important in light of the 
accurate measurement of the effects of the trade restrictions and 
macroeconomic/market factors on imported volumes from Canada. We examine the 
dynamic effects of the lumber price, housing starts, disposable income, wage rate and 
exchange rate on U.S. lumber imports from Canada and assess the economic 
consequences of the SLA06. Our empirical results show that macroeconomic 
variables are more important than lumber price in determining the bilateral trade in 
softwood lumber. It is also found that the SLA06 had a significant effect on the 
lumber market in the second half of 2007, which decreased Canadian exports by 
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approximately 9 percent; however, the overall efficiency costs of the SLA06 are 
moderate. Jungho Baek 
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Note: The prevailing monthly price means the most recent four-week average of the weekly 
framing lumber composite (FLC) prices (produced by Random Lengths Publications 
Incorporated) available 21 days before the beginning of the month to which the prevailing 
monthly price shall be applied (Annex 7A). The monthly EUSC means the volume of 







Option A:  
export charge 
 (% of export price) 
Option B: 
export charge with volume restraint 
(% of export price) 
Over $US355  No export charge 
 
No export charge and no volume restraint 
 
$US336-355  5% 
2.5% export charge + maximum volume that can be 
exported to the U.S. cannot exceed the region’s share of 
34% of expected U.S. consumption for the month 
$US316-335  10% 
3.0% export charge + maximum volume that can be 
exported to the U.S. cannot exceed the region’s share of 
32% of expected U.S. consumption for the month 
$US315 or under  15%
5.0% export charge + maximum volume that can be 
exported to the U.S. cannot exceed the region’s share of Jungho Baek 
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Table 2  Effects of the Trade Restrictions and Macroeconomic Factors on U.S. 

































Note: ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  
 
Dependent variable: U.S. lumber imports from Canada 
Independent variables  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Lumber price  0.142  4.072** 
Housing starts  0.497  12.827** 
Disposable income  0.811  6.010** 
Wage rate  -0.957  -6.671** 
Exchange rate  0.606  6.360** 
MOU (Jan. 1990-Sept. 
1991)  
-0.059  -2.418** 
96 SLA (Apr. 1996-Mar. 
2001) 
-0.019  -1.484 
Ι - 06 SLA (Jan. 2007-Jun. 
2007) 
-0.0163  -0.489 
Π - 06 SLA (Jul. 2007-Dec. 
2007) 
-0.091  -2.437** 
ΠΙ - 06 SLA (Jan. 2008-Oct. 
2009) 
-0.262  -5.789** 
Constant  -1.894  -1.417 Jungho Baek 
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Note: For sensitivity analysis, different price elasticities estimated from previous studies are 
adopted for case І (demand: -0.08; domestic supply: 0.13; and Canadian exports: 0.18) and 
case II (demand: -0.174; domestic supply: 0.70; and Canadian exports: 0.917). All values for 
welfare impact are in US$ million 2005.  
 

















Note: All values for welfare impact are in US$ million 2005. Price elasticities estimated from 
Baek and Yin (2006) are used (demand: -0.15; domestic supply: 0.25; and Canadian exports: 
0.18). Quantity changes are relatively insensitive to price elasticities estimated from other 
studies. Other exports (producer surplus) are the volume of Canadian exporters (provinces) 
that are not subject to the SLA06 such as the Maritimes and the Northwest Territories. 
 

























(MMBF)  -322.0  -113.6  -181.0  -30.2 
Production 
(MMBF)  +359.6  +59.9  +500.5  +83.4 
Canadian exports 
(MMBF)  -681.6  -113.6  -681.6  -113.6 
Price 
















  U.S. consumer surplus  -1,044.4  -174.1  -269.2  -44.8 
U.S. producer surplus  +704.8  +117.4  +181.4  +30.2 
U.S. net impact  -339.6  -56.6  -87.8  -14.6 
Canadian producer surplus  +881.6  +146.9  -150.1  -25.0 
Canadian net impact  +1,171.1  +195.2  +139.4  +23.2 
 

















(MMBF)  +72.5  +18.1  +0.3 
Production 
(MMBF)  -82.8  -20.7  -0.5 
Canadian exports 
(MMBF)  +155.3  +38.8  +2.0 
Other exports 
(MMBF)  -25.1  -6.3  -2.8 
Price 
















U.S. consumer surplus  +132.2  +33.1  +0.6 
U.S. producer surplus  -91.3  -22.8  -2.1 
U.S. net impact  +40.8  +10.2  +0.1 
Canadian producer surplus  +3.7  +0.9  +0.2 
Other producer surplus  -5.8  -1.5  -1.1 
Canadian net impact  -2.1  -0.6  -0.1 Jungho Baek 
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1.  It is assumed here that, without the financial crisis that occurred in 2008, the 
SLA06 would have depressed imports of Canadian lumber by 9 percent,  as was 
found from the dummy for SLA06-П (July 2007-December 2007). 
2.  Over-exports occurred mainly in the first quarter of 2007 and for the provinces of 
Ontario and Quebec; there was no single incident of over-export by Saskatchewan, 
and excessive exports from Manitoba were very small (1.4 MMBF). For the sake 
of brevity, the calculation procedures are not reported here. 
3.  To assess the welfare impact of Canadian over-exports, we first simulated what 
market conditions would have been if there had been no Canadian breach of 
SLA06. We did this using actual consumption, production, Canadian exports, and 
market price during the time. Additionally, Canadian provinces are divided into 
two groups – one group that is subject to SLA06 export measures (both Option A 
and Option B regions) and another that is not subject to SLA06 export measures 
(the Maritimes and the Northwest Territories). Then, assuming that the Option A 
regions (BC Coast/Interior and Alberta) did not over-export softwood lumber to 
the U.S. during the time under consideration, we estimated the impact of the over-
exports from the Option B region on the U.S. and Canadian markets. 